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I. Description of Legal Basis'
By a regulation of the Council of the European communities of 7 May 1990% 
the European Environment Agency was set up, after a prolonged discussion, 
with its seat in Copenhagen. It began working on 34-October-1994. Its task 
consists primarily in building a European information and observation network 
to put the Community and the Member States in a position to gather objective, 
reliable and readily comparable information as a basis for environment 
protection measures and their assessment, and provide technical and scientific 
support for environmentally relevant decisions and informing the public.
Its task is made more specific in Article 2: the agency (EEA) is to gather data on 
the state of the environment, analyse and use them to produce expert reports on 
the nature and intensity of burdens on the environment and develop uniform 
assessment criteria for the environmental data used, with a view to improving 
the implementation of European environmental law. It should also help to make 
the collection of environmental data uniform at European level, and where 
necessary harmonize measuring methods on this basis; this should promote 
consideration for European information in international environment 
monitoring programmes, development of forecasting and assessment methods 
and the exchange of information on the best available environmental 
technologies, as well as helping to develop methods for evaluating 
environmental damage and costs of protecting the environment. The European 
public is to be informed on the state of the environment every three years 
through an environmental report; the first has now been presented, in November 
19951 23. By Article 3 of the regulation, the agency is to set priorities in its work; 
the criteria set for this are, however, couched very broadly, ranging from air and 
water pollution through refuse disposal to climate protection.
A striking feature of the structure and process of the EEA’s exercise of its 
functions is recourse to the network concept (Article 4), already repeatedly 
made in other European legal provisions to protect the environment and other 
complex public goods. The agency is not to operate like a German Anstalt 
(institution), an autonomous technical institution working on precise deadlines 
laid down by an “institutional director”, but to guarantee mutual linkage (in 
particular) with national central organizations for information-gathering and 
coordination and facilitate cooperation with sectoral centres to be formed in
1 Text translated by lain L Fraser.
2 Council Regulation n°1210/90, 7 May 1990 (OJ N” L120, 11.5.1990, p. 1).




























































































The European Environment Agency and Prospects for a European Network of Environmental Administrations
particular areas and in turn linked up on the basis of an agreement with the 
agency into a sort of specialized network among the bodies involved. On this 
basis, for instance, the German Federal Environment Office has been entrusted 
with the sector of air pollution; it works together with corresponding 
organizations in France and Britain. Establishment of the sectors is to be fleshed 
out in a multi-year programme of work, but in principle to be time limited.
This special construction is also reflected in the organizational structure: the 
agency, which has legal personality, has a management board consisting of 
Member State representatives, to draw up the multi-year working programme. 
The EEA is thus largely independent of the Commission, but closely associated 
with Member State administrations; the German representative is the Secretary 
of State in the Environment Ministry. The agency has an executive director 
appointed by the management board on proposal from the Commission. A 
scientific advisory committee has also been set up, participating in, for instance, 
selecting scientific staff. Article 20 contains a revision clause providing that the 
Council shall not later than two years after entry into force of the regulation 
decide, on the basis of a Commission report and proposals, on the adoption of 
further tasks, in particular monitoring the implementation of European 
environment legislation (in cooperation with the Commission and other bodies) 
issuing environment marks and developing criteria for conferring them on new 
environment-friendly products, commodities, technologies, services and 
resource-saving programmes, and also for assessing environmental 
compatibility in procedures corresponding with the European Community 
Directive adopted thereupon4.
II. The Position of the EEA in the EC’s Institutional Structure
1. Organizational Competence of the EC
The revision clause points to the conflict there was over the structure of the 
agency. The European Parliament in particular had pressed for stressing its role 
in the process of applying and monitoring European environmental law5.
4 Council Directive N°85/337, 27 June 1985 (OJ N° L175, 5 July 1985, p. 40).
5 On this see the House of Lords Report, Session 94/95, Fifth Report, Select Committee on the 
European Communities, European Environment Agency, 14.2.1995, p.6; European Trends, 
N°4 (1989), p.8; and on the problem of implementing environmental law see also the 
thorough House of Lords Report, Session 91/92, Ninth Report, Select Committee on the 






























































































This proposal did not make it, but the problem has not been definitively dealt 
with. The clause itself however, seems scarcely convincing, since the basis for a 
decision can hardly have become much different after two years. And in fact, 
the Commission report has not yet been submitted.
Another basic problem was to answer the question whether the EEC Treaty at 
all contains an adequate empowerment basis for creating new European 
administrative entities, and what is more equipped with legal personality. The 
organizational competence for this is derived in the regulation from the 
provisions on the Community’s environmental competence6. This 
organizational competence of the EC has not yet been the object of decision in 
ECJ case law on the EEC Treaty; however, the Court of Justice did have to deal 
with a corresponding question for the European Coal and Steel Community in 
the Meroni case, where it interpreted the organizational competence narrowly7. 
It does seem doubtful whether the case law developed for the narrowly 
delimited task of the Coal and Steel Community can be transferred to the 
broader-based integrational constitution of the EEC8. On the other hand, the fact 
that the agency has no powers of decision externally ought not to be decisive 
since the point here is not the constitutional one of empowerment to intervene 
in citizens’ rights, but the distribution of powers between national and 
supranational level. This question also arises in a federal State (cf., eg., Article 
87 Basic Law) and is - irrespective of the question of the power to decide 
externally - been decided explicitly in the Federal Republic with certain 
restrictions, in favour of the federal level. Details need not be gone into here, 
since the special feature of the agency is precisely that, as indicated above, it is 
to be fitted into a network structure9, that allows the Member States more 
influence than they would have under the alternative version of setting up an 
information and planning division within the Commission. At any rate, the 
creation of these organizations, based on a network model and not
6 Cf. Arts. 2,3 of the Regulations.
7 ECR [1958] 9.
8 H.P. Ipsen, “Die Verfassungsrolle des Europaischen Gerichtshofs ftir die Integration”, in : J. 
Schwarze (Ed.), Der Europdische Gerichtshof als Verfassungsgericht und 
Rechtsschutzinstanz, Baden-Baden, 1983, p. 29; c f  also G. F. Schuppert, “Zur Staatswerdung 
Europas”, Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis, 1994, p.35ff.
9 Approaches to this sort of network structure can also be found in other recent EC legal 
provisions, like the Council Directive of 25 February 1993 regulating support to the 
Commission by collaboration from Member States in the scientific verification of foodstuff 
questions (OJ N° L52,4.3.1993, p.18-21); cf. also the Commission decision on the 
administrative organization of cooperation on the scientific verification of foodstuff questions 
(OJ N° L189, 23.7.1994, p. 84f); cf also C. Joerges, Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation 
and the European Court o f Justice: Legal Frameworks fo r Denationalized Governance 




























































































The European Environment Agency and Prospects for a European Network of Environmental Administrations
institutionally, procedurally, or substantively increasing the weight of 
supranational bodies vis-à-vis the Member States, ought to be compatible with 
the distribution of powers in the Treaty. The difference becomes clear from the 
construction of the management board, controlled entirely by Member State 
representatives. This also shows that in the development of dogmatics in 
European Community law analogies to the constitutional law of federal States 
may be helpful, but that the peculiarities arising from the stronger position of 
Member States at Community level must always be taken into account.
2. Information or Inspection?
The European Parliament particularly criticized the lack of formal control and 
intervention possibilities vis-à-vis Member State administrations, and called for 
a sort of “environmental inspectorate”10 1. There is after all an example of this in 
the EC in the form of the Fisheries Inspectorate", which can carry out checks 
on Member States even with effect against individuals. The same is true of 
breaches of competition12. But the difference from environmental 
administration is that it concerns preventing unilateral advantages by individual 
Member States at the expense of others, especially those that threaten agreed 
Community policy because of the necessary reciprocity of commitments 
undertaken. Moreover, the information relevant to decisions is often hard to get 
because the private individuals involved can shield their conduct from view and 
the disadvantage arises almost exclusively in other Member States, not in the 
one on whose territory the legal infringement is threatened or has occurred. But 
environmental law is an extremely complex legal area in which there is no 
comparable unambiguous interest structure; moreover, the interpenetration of 
special European and general national environment law (and beyond that, 
general administrative law) is in need of clarification13. Especially, the 
development of dogmatics oriented towards coordination of national and 
European environmental law would be desirable. But particularly in relatively
10 cf. in general D.A. Westbrook, “Environmental Policy in the European Community: 
Observations on the European Environment Agency”, Harvard Environmental Law Review, 
1991, 257, 264; P. Bourdeau, “The European Environmental Agency in the Context of the 
European Community Environmental Policy”, Columbia Journal o f World Business, 1993,
112ff.; cf. also House of Lords, op. cit., (FN 4), 1995, p.14.
11 cf. A. Bleckmann (H. Schneider), Europarecht, 5th ed., Cologne, 1990, NM067.
12 Bleckmann (Schneider), op. cit,. (FN 10).
13 See, from the now ample literature, F. Schoch, “Die Europaisierung des allgemeinen 
Verwaltungsrechts”, JZ, 1995, 109ff.; E. Schmidt-Assmann, “Deutsches und europaisches 
Verwaltungsrecht - wechselseitige Einwirkungen”, DVB, 1 1993, 924ff.; M. Zuleeg and H.W. 
Rengeling, “Deutsches und europaisches Verwaltungsrecht - wechselseitige Einwirkungen”, 
WDStRL, 53 (1994), p.l54ff. and p.202ff; see also K.H. Ladeur, “Supra- und transnationale 





























































































unambiguous cases of environmental infringements, the national interest ought 
either itself to be strongly affected, or else the lack of willingness for 
environment protection in a Member State (harming its own long-term interests) 
is more the expression of a general pressure of problems coming from other 
weaknesses, particularly economic but also administrative ones, which 
intervention from outside can circumvent, possibly sparking off defensive 
actions. Without a greater degree of cooperation, transparency and information 
on problems of implementing environmental law in Member States, an 
“Environmental Inspectorate” could scarcely work - as a comparative look at 
the problems of implementing national environmental law makes clear.
3. Europeanization of Environment Law and the Limits to the Administrative 
Law Regulatory Model
A further weighty argument has to be taken into account in assessing the 
construction of the EEA: in national environment law too, the administrative- 
law regulatory approach prevailing hitherto, based on detailed normative 
frameworks and corresponding control requirements, is increasingly coming up 
against its limits and being called into question by more flexible instruments of 
informal coordination, agreements, and incentives etc. In the face of 
complexity, the administration increasingly has to decide on a basis of 
uncertainty (of various types: empirical, methodical or theoretical)14, because 
the knowledge required for decision is becoming increasingly specialized and 
no longer automatically available to the authority. This also makes checks more 
difficult. The employment of informal instruments15 is coming about just 
because in the event of conflict the chances of a trial seem hard to reckon. 
Looked at from outside, that is, from a supranational decisional level, these 
implementation problems would likely be even harder to handle. Additionally, 
the associated problem of creating unintended negative effects is increasingly 
arising: particularly recourse to concealment measures or to the shifting of a 
problem from one subject area to another. This is particularly to be expected in 
an environment law. In relatively unambiguous cases of breaches of European 
environment law, the Commission has the procedure of applying to the ECJ
14 V.R. Walker, “The Siren Songs of Science: Toward a Taxonomy of Scientific 
Understanding for Decisionmaking”, Connecticut Law Review, 1991, 567ff.; idem, 
Evidentiary Difficulties with Quantitative Risk Assessment, Columbia Journal o f 
Environmental Law, 1989, 467ff.
15 H. Schulze-Fielitz, “Kooperatives Recht im Spannungsfeld von Rechtsstaatsprinzip und 
Verfahrensokonomie”, DVBL, 1994, 657ff.; N. Dose, “Kooperatives Recht”, Die Verwaltung, 
1994, 91 ff.; H. Dreier, “Informales Verwaltungshandeln”, Staatswissenschaften und 
Staatspraxis, 1993, 647ff.; E.H. Ritter, “Das Recht als Steuerungsmedium im kooperativen 




























































































The European Environment Agency and Prospects for a European Network of Environmental Administrations
under Article 169 EEC available; and individuals and firms affected as third 
parties, or environment associations, can also be important guarantors of the 
implementation of European environment law., by initiating decisions of 
national courts.
On top of this problem of securing information on environment quality in a 
narrower sense comes the difficulty of assessing the strengths and weaknesses 
of the various administrative systems in which the limits of administrative law 
are reflected in specific forms in each case. This could make the intrinsic 
difficulties of the administrative-law model percolate through to checks on 
national administrations by the supranational European Community level. This 
is all the more so since the relatively small size of the European administration 
would in any case set narrow limits to systematic monitoring of national 
implementation and application of European law. This does not of course mean 
that in many cases European checks on national administration might not be 
entirely appropriate.
The possibilities of supranational intervention are, however, set in advance by 
the differing efficiency of national administrations. This reflects the particular 
complexity of environment administration: mostly the point will not be a simple 
alternative between application and non-application of European environment 
law. But this is what the approach to date, oriented on monitoring 
implementation, has pursued. It sees the trap of openly collusive or negligent 
versions of the ignoring of European law, which are certainly important in 
individual cases, even though scientific research on implementation has so far 
shown that it is more the limits to the adaptability of national administrations to 
European provisions (with the best of goodwill) that are decisive16. In view of 
this position, it might very well prove fruitful for the European Environment 
Agency to limit itself primarily to handling information, and also to methodical 
and strategic problems, but not to be given any executive tasks.
Below we shall first take a comparative look at the EEA’s similarities and 
differences with other national environment agencies, before going on to raise 
issues of cooperation in international treaty systems. This is important because 
the position of the European Community (and its administration) is located in 
intergovernmental and international organizational forms, while its peculiarity 
within an incomplete “transitional constitution” requires the drawing of
16 On implementation of EC law cf. H. Siedentopf (ed.), Europàische Integration und 





























































































analogies to other forms of organization, but also conceptual innovation and 
adaptability on that basis17.
III. Comparative Considerations of Environment Agencies in the US, UK, 
and Germany
1. The example of the American Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
The best-known version of an environment agency is the US EPA18. The 
organizational form, details of which cannot be gone into, has long differed 
from European administrative forms by the fact that alongside a multiplicity of 
administrative investigative procedures and individual decisions it has extensive 
powers of regulation that at least partially correspond to the European concept 
of delegated law-making, though without ultimately being bound in general in a 
comparable form by specific empowerments (cf. e.g. Article 80 of the Basic 
Law). The model of the American agencies is based primarily on the concept of 
the autonomy of technological knowledge as the basis for administrative 
action19, that can no longer be oriented on a pragmatically-applicable concept of 
more or less manifest common interests of citizens. In Europe the statute as 
basis for legitimation, albeit in the form of a statutorily-defined empowerment 
for regulation, has been able to develop much greater flexibility.
Particularly in the last few years it has become apparent that this model of 
technocratic concentration of far-reaching regulatory empowerment is 
increasingly coming up against limits and facing the problem of the re-entry of 
social options into technically-oriented procedures. The various problems of 
uncertainty are, with the dissolution of stable, evenly-developing experience 
and the consensus on the development of technology it supported, increasingly 
emerging as an obstacle to consistent regulatory practice, with the consequence 
of overloading through self-blocking. This is reflected, for instance, in the 
development of contradictory rules of proof and evaluation. On the one hand, 
uncertainties of various forms become visible and increase the need for 
information, while on the other assessment methods themselves often become
17 K.H. Ladeur, “European Community Institutional Reforms”, Legal issues o f European 
Integration, 1990, vol. 2 ,Iff.
18 Cf. in general M.K. Landy/M.J. Roberts, The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the 
Wrong Questions, New York, 1990; D.R. Whitnah (ed.), Government Agencies, Westport 
1983; P.L. Strauss, ‘The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the 
Fourth Branch of Government”, Columbia Law Review, 1994, 573ff.
19 M.J. Shapiro, Who Guards the Guardians?, Athens 1988; idem, The Frontiers o f Science 




























































































The European Environment Agency and Prospects for a European Network of Environmental Administrations
so uncertain that one cannot get beyond the traditional liberal rule of 
presumption in favour of the freedom of action and decision of private persons, 
since the potential need for information has to be limited by stopping rules. The 
resulting dilemma can be shown by the fact alone that the EPA, for instance in 
chemicals control procedures (Toxic Substances Control Act, TSCA), has a 
relatively far-reaching possibility of imposing information obligations (tests 
etc) on the user (and can thus cause considerable costs), while as regards 
decision of the matter itself it ultimately remains more or less strongly bound by 
whatever rule of evidence may apply20. In these circumstances it is no longer 
easy to see whether and to what extent increasing information duties at all helps 
to improve environment protection21.
The dominance of technocratic components in the construction of the American 
EGA is logically reflected first in the fact that the US has refrained from 
forming a separate environment ministry, and Congress has consistently 
exercised only very broad task assignment and monitoring. In recent years this 
relatively uniform coherent concept has crumbled in many ways. That 
decisional problems can no longer be solved by technocratic knowledge alone is 
a fact that can no longer be ignored. This has led to a political vacuum that has 
been filled by a variety of heterogeneous, fragmented political elements, that 
cannot compensate for the lack of political control over environment-related 
regulations. Congress has tied Acts increasingly to time limits or 
comprehensive reporting requirements intended to enhance parliamentary 
control, but at the same time questioned the agency’s original conception 
without being able to put a new model in its place22. The EPA has reacted to the 
overload and fragmentation of tasks most recently by various priority-setting
20 Cf. only J.S. Applegate, ‘The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy 
and Toxic Substances Control”, Columbia Law Review, 1991, 261ff.; A.C. Flournoy, 
Legislative Inaction: “Asking the Wrong Questions in Environmental Decisionmaking”, 
Harvard Environmental Law Review, 1991, 227ff.; H.L. Latin, “Good Science, Bad 
Regulation and Toxic Risk Assessment”, Yale Journal on Regulation, 1988, 89ff.
21 Cf. in general M.L. Lyndon, “Information Economics”, Michigan Law Review, 1989,
1793ff.
22 Cf. R.N.L. Andrews, “Long-Range Planning in Environmental Health Regulatory 
Agencies”, Ecology Law Quarterly, 1993, 515ff.; Report of National Commission on the 
Environment: “Choosing a Sustainable Future”, Washington 1993; U.S.-EPA: Report on the 
Ecological Risk Assessment Guidelines, Strategic Planning Workshop, February 1992; 
U.S.EPA, Science Advisory Board, Reducing Risk: “Setting Priorities and Strategies for 
Environmental Pollution”, September 1990; US-EPA, Science Advisory Board, Research 
Strategies for the 1990s, 1991; see also W.Y. Brown, “Environmental Leadership. The Search 
for Priorities and Power”, Environmental Law, 1991, 1413; W. Riley, “Taking Aim Toward 
2000: Rethinking the Nation’s Environmental Agency”, Environmental Law, 1991, 1359ff.; 
D.W. Warren/G.E. Marchant, “More Good than Harm: A First Principle for Environmental 





























































































approaches (to which we shall return). From the viewpoint of European Law the 
EPA, in view of the different administrative traditions in European countries, 
would not seem an example that could be taken over. In particular, the heavy 
stress on technocracy as the basis of legitimation for environment-related 
regulation seems with the evolution of technology and science to have lost 
much of its vigour. It is most notably the approaches to priority-setting in the 
EPA’s work developing in response to overloading that might be made use of in 
designing a European environment agency.
2. Britain’s Environmental Agency
In Britain too, an Environmental Agency has recently been created23. Its special 
feature is that alongside information-related tasks it was supposed especially to 
guarantee a development of organizational and procedural rules suitable for the 
transition to “integrative pollution control”24. The agency is supposed to help 
make data on environment pollution uniform for decisions on plant licensing25. 
Article 5 (1) of the 1995 Act inter alia gives it relatively generally couched 
regulatory powers to prevent, avoid, eliminate and compensate for pollution and 
to collect information as the basis for the exercise of its own control and 
regulatory tasks and for environmental reporting purposes26. It is also, at the 
request of the competent minister, to undertake environmental impact 
assessments, generally or specifically. The Agency has also to make 
comparative evaluations of different environment policy options and strategies. 
The special feature of the British agency is particularly that performance of its 
duties is linked to a requirement to do cost-benefit analyses. In Britain there has 
been a debate on including market elements in environment policy, which did 
not however ultimately lead to replacing traditional administrative instruments 
on any broad scale by new market forms of environment policy27. At any rate, 
the stronger emphasis on cost-benefit analysis expresses a different conception 
of environment agency from the US: it is not, as the original American EPA 
concept was, marked by a technocratic conception of the environment problem, 
presumed to be homogeneous, that is autonomous vis-à-vis publicly defined 
policy, but seeks to lay down criteria and methods for handling decisional
23 Environment A c t, in the version of 10.8.1995 (Halsbury’s Statutes, Cum Supplement 1995, 
vol.35, p. 13ff., eh. 1, § Iff.)
24 D. Helm, “Reforming Environmental Regulation in the U.K.”, Oxford Review o f Economic 
Policy, 1993 (N°4), Iff.; L.Hancher, “Risk Regulation in the U.K.”, Conference paper, Oct. 
1995.
25 Cf. for the German legal development W. Pauly/C. Liitzeler, “Fachbehòrdlicher 
Priifungsumfang und parallele Genehmigungsverfahren im Umwelt- und 
Gefahrenabwehrrecht” , DÒV, 1995, 545ff.
26 Hancher, op. cit. (FN23, p. 13)




























































































The European Environment Agency and Prospects for a European Network of Environmental Administrations
problems in conditions of complexity where there is a wealth of alternatives. In 
this case the legislator trusts particularly in more economically oriented forms 
of risk comparison and risk assessment, which are anyway built in to the 
environment law machinery as an additional component.
3. The German Federal Environmental Office
The German model of the Federal Environmental Office (UBA) differs from the 
British and the American versions of environment agency by the strong 
dominance of information tasks28. The UBA is to support the competent Federal 
minister scientifically on a multiplicity of environment policy questions, 
especially in developing legal and administrative provisions and designing the 
bases for environment measures and procedures. It also has extensive tasks in 
building up information systems on environment planning and documentation; 
and special acts (§2 (3), (4) UBAG) or administrative delegation on the basis of 
statutes also give it tasks of collaborating on individual decisions, particularly 
on procedures requiring a high degree of technical and scientific expertise (cf. 
e.g. § 16 (4) GenTG, in connection with decisions on liberating genetically 
engineered organisms). The UBA is also represented on various expert 
committees that draft administrative provisions or have general advisory duties.
The UBA’s organizational and procedural position is, by comparison with the 
American or British example, particularly marked by its having a rather 
marginal involvement in regulatory tasks in the narrow sense. This job is done 
mostly by the competent Federal minister, with the support of advisory bodies 
set up by him more on bases of political, scientific and economic pluralism (e.g. 
§§ 48, 52 BImSchG). The office as a Federal umbrella agency, has no legal 
personality of its own, and thus does not have the position of an “Agency” like 
the American EPA, largely independent of government29. One problem for the 
UBA’s position arises also from the fact that the Federal minister himself has a 
large administrative apparatus with appropriate expertise (which is not the case 
in the USA, for instance). A further peculiarity is that the Federal government 
has only minor powers in the area of environment administration and is thus 
largely confined to environment legislation, including the setting of
28 UBAG, 22.7.1974 (BGB11 1505), last amended by Act of 24.6.1994 (BGB11 11416); on its 
work, see most recently the UBA report for 1994, esp. p. 8.
29 This must however be qualified to the extent that the EPA has an only partly independent 
position. While it is not subject to instructions from the President, he has the right to dismiss 
its head. Additionally, the President expresses “wishes” on intended regulations, the 






























































































administrative provisions. The actual administrative tasks are mainly for the 
Lander. The UBA’s assessment tasks are limited accordingly.
4. Comparative Considerations
In the light of the themes we are pursuing here, for this very reason a 
comparison between the European model of the EEA and the German UBA 
might suggest itself. On second thoughts, though, this can be seen to be rather 
deceptive: the political autonomy of the Lander is far less marked than that of 
individual EU Member States. This is reflected particularly in the differing legal 
dogmatic and administrative traditions. The German Federal State is marked 
instead by close coordination which has harmonizing effects as against the 
administrative and legal separations. It is not without reason that K.Hesse has 
spoken about development towards a “unitary Federal state”30. For the EC’s 
further development it is more new types of loose procedural forms of 
coordination and cooperation, able to change with the times, that are needed, in 
environment policy too31. Here the German model of the UBA, because of the 
strong political dominance of the ministry administration on the one hand and 
the administrative dominance of the Lander on the other, has probably less to 
contribute than the American or British model. This is confirmed by the fact 
that the very aspect of the American EPA that might offer suggestions for 
further development of the EEA has to do less with the fact that the US is 
federal than with development of a strategy to make technocratic knowledge 
independent as the basis for environment-related decisions. It is also relevant on 
the other hand that the Commission has less material and staff capacity to 
formulate environmental policy than the German Federal minister - another 
point of likeness with the US. There is a parallel, also, because given that 
political control over the American EPA is less developed than in the German 
system, there is much greater concentration on the central position of the law 
and an associated conception of ministerial responsibility, leaving less 
legitimation for administrative discretion.
Summarizing, it may be said that the American, British and German models 
offer three different versions of the structure of an environment agency that the 
development of the European model could partly imitate, and partly distinguish 
itself from. In the last analysis, though, the German version offers little political 
room for manoeuvre, and the American one is in a transitional phase, because 
its technocratic conception has come up against its limits, while the British one, 
about which not much can yet be said for lack of practical experience, is
30 K. Hesse, Der unitarische Bundesstaat, Karlsruhe 1962.




























































































The European Environment Agency and Prospects for a European Network of Environmental Administrations
looking for a new approach differing from technocratical strategies by setting 
priorities according to economic cost-benefit analysis. It can be shown that the 
EEA must in many respects differ from national models; at least this should 
have emerged from our brief comparison. Its special feature is the network 
construction mentioned. On the other hand, the guidance problems of national 
environmental agencies existing in the European States and the US must also be 
taken account of in further strategic development of the EEA. Some views on 
this will be outlined below.
IV. New Forms of Cooperation in Networks
In the legal and political academic literature on international relations, the view 
has increasingly taken shape in recent years that the dynamics of international 
treaties and the creation of international and supranational organizations based 
on them can only very inadequately be seen as located between the poles of 
State sovereignty on the one hand and bipolar or multipolar treaty links on the 
other. Instead, new forms of lasting association of the agents involved can be 
noted that develop a network of relationships that in turn produces overlapping 
dynamic linkage effects. This effect, which separates and becomes autonomous 
from the agreed will laid down in treaties, can be summed up in the term 
“regime”. On a widespread definition, the regime is a stock of “implicit or 
explicit principles, standards, rules and decisional procedures on which the 
expectations of actors in a given field of international relations converge”32. 
Even if the EC has the nature of a supranational organization, this changes 
nothing in the fact that its organizational structure too is in part more like an 
open, heterarchical, dynamic form of cooperation and coordination, not in line 
with the traditional conception of the division of superordination and 
subordination relations and relatively precise stratification of tasks developed in 
the analysis of States33. This is perhaps the explanation for the need to develop 
common legal dogmatics, or a new model of coordination of differing 
dogmatics using a “conflict of laws” doctrine, which goes beyond the 
implementation of individual norms34. If these dynamic coordination effects are
32 S.D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables”, in: Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca, 1983, p. Iff.; S. Haggard/B.A. 
Simmons, “Theory of International Regimes”, International Organizations, 1987,491 ff.; F.V. 
Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions, Cambridge, 1989.
33 K.N. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, New York, 1979, esp. p. 66, 8 Iff.
34 U. Ehricke, “Die richtlinienkonforme und die gemeinschaftsrechtskonforme Auslegung 
nationalen Rechts”, Rabels Z„ 1995, 598ff. ; D.Hommelhoff, “Zivilrecht unter dem EinfluB 
Europâisches Gemeinschaftsrecht und Privatrecht”, NJW, 1993, 13ff.; BS. Markesinis (ed.), 





























































































taken more account of as normatively relevant relationships that create 
expectations and conventions, a new perspective can be developed for European 
administrative law in general and environment law in particular, which could 
also be useful for defining the position of the EEA. From this viewpoint the 
question of the independency of agencies can be put differently: if and insofar 
as the hierarchical model of control, even in its democratic version, can no 
longer make any monopoly claim, other forms for guaranteeing transparency 
and responsibility vis-à-vis central bodies must be thought up35.
It is, moreover, interesting that this same hierarchical model is also increasingly 
coming up against limits within the State’s sphere itself, because the horizontal 
and vertical stratification of tasks is now supplemented and made permeable by 
the formation of dynamic networks of relationships among non-hierarchically 
linked administrative bodies, focused on variable task performance, going 
beyond the hitherto known forms of occasional cooperation among Lander (in 
the Federal State) and municipalities36. This new form of administrative 
cooperation is distinguished, within the State too, just because this network 
behaviour creates a “synergetic surplus” that points beyond traditional forms of 
agreements and coordination, without thereby creating a new “dominant 
subject”37, as was similarly possible in the classical form of the special 
association38. Networks differ just because they are based on coordinating 
differing actors with differing efficiencies and open expectations, while at the 
same time neither the overall effect of the links that arise nor the mutual 
advantages and disadvantages for those involved can be estimated exactly. This 
is all the more true since the dynamics of cooperation are supposed to produce 
an extra-productive effect of innovation. Accordingly, a network is not to be 
equated with anarchy any more than is the international regime. For its 
functional capacity, the role of a “stimulator and stabilizer” may be very
Convergence: Foreign Ideas, Foreign Influences, and English Law on the Eve o f the 21st 
Century, Oxford 1994;”EuGH”, JZ, 1994, 94 with note by W. Steindorff.
35 Cf. G. Majone, Independence vs. Accountability? Non-Majoritarian Institutions and 
Democratic Government in Europe, EU1 WP-SPS 94/3; G. Majone, Mutual Trust, Credible 
Commitments, and the Evolution o f Rules fo r a Single European Market, EUI WP-RSC 95/1.
36 Cf. in general F.W. Scharpf, “Mehrebenenpolitik im vollendeten Binnenmarkt”, MPI f. 
Gesellschaftschaftsforschung”, Discussion Paper 94/4; R. Mayntz, “Modernization and the 
Logic of Inter-Organizational Networks”, Knowledge and Policy, 1993, 3ff.
37 E.H. Ritter, Raumpolitik mit “Stadtenetzen” - Oder regionale Raumpolitik der 
verschiedenen Ebenen, DOV, 1995, 393, 395; on environment policy cf. F. Bons, “Product- 
Oriented Environmental Policy and Networks”, Environment Politics, 92 (N°4), 84, 86; on 
Europe specifically: R.Pitschas, “Europaische Integration als Netzwerkkoordination 
komplexer Staatsaufgaben”, Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis, 1994, 502ff.




























































































The European Environment Agency and Prospects for a European Network of Environmental Administrations
important19. This sort of role could be the EEA’s too , say in the area of 
European environment policy, as long as it stabilizes cooperation in particular 
forms, supports and facilitates network-performing behaviour, and thus in 
general stresses a synergetic effect within a strengthening network. This would 
be all the more important for the EEA because its rather slight resources mean 
that there can from the outset be no overevaluation of its existing autonomous 
powers of action. If these network effects among the national organizations 
participating can be stabilized, the danger of the agency’s being gridlocked by 
the heavy influence of national ministry administrations on the management 
board will also be limited39 40.
It follows from these considerations that the EEA could be seen as an example 
of a new type of network administration, the forms of which have frequently 
been described in both international and national contexts in recent years, and 
could also give new stimuli to the EC conception. It emerges, thus, that 
especially the waiving of executive control powers in determining the EEA’s 
tasks is fully in line with a new model administration that can cope with the 
openness and complexity of the task and the need involved to produce 
innovation through cooperation.
While so far it is more the structure of the EEA we have been concentrating on, 
we shall look more closely below at how it can substantively and procedurally 
help to fertilize the development of environment law and environment policy in 
Europe through new impulses. To the fore will be the consideration of whether 
and how far a new European institution might be used to learn from the 
weaknesses of the existing, mainly administratively conceived environment 
law.
V. The Need for Priority Setting in Environment Law and Policy
1. Complexity as a Challenge
One of the EEA’s most urgent tasks is certainly to develop data collection 
systems and measuring programmes to guarantee the comparability of the 
empirical basis of environment policy in Member States and in the EC. In this 
respect there are in part sizeable differences, as regards both the quantity of data
39 Ritter, op. cit., (FN 36), 401.
40 K. Konig, “Neue” Verwaltung Oder Verwaltungsmodemisierung: Verwaltungspolitik in den 
90er Jahren, DOV, 1995, 349ff.; G.F. Schuppert, Stoat, Dritter Sektor - oder noch mehr?, 
Jahrbuch zur Stoats- und Verwaltungswissenschaft, 1989, 474ff.; Schuppert, “Die Einheit der 





























































































and the procedure for describing and assessing them. The agency also has 
publicity duties, met in 1995 by presenting its first comprehensive report. This 
gives a very clear survey of pollution in Europe but also shows the gaps in 
information, particularly about the environmental position in Central and 
Eastern Europe. There is an impressive list of informants that have contributed 
to the report. The EEA’s real administrative task, however, must lie more in an 
area between the performing of clearly defined task (measuring air pollution 
from particular substances) and the overall description of the state of the 
environment. It is clear that generally-worded reports, even if they also 
formulate administrative tasks41, ultimately contain much too highly-aggregated 
descriptions to be able to give the outlines for a decision-oriented environment 
strategy. The existing administrative and legislative decisional procedures are 
based on the assumption42 that alternatives are readily describable and the 
normative framework for decision correspondingly stable within particular 
degrees of fluctuation from the mean. Especially the causality model that 
reckons with the natural stratification of complexity levels and makes relatively 
simple cause-effect attributions on this basis was an essential part of the rational 
decision model. Today’s environmental administration must instead operate 
with poorly-structured complexity43. This means that not only have the 
scientific and decisional problems become more complicated, but especially 
that the hierarchical division of general and particular that could previously be 
assumed, especially the allocation of effects to causes, the durable 
establishment of private rights and public legal goods, and the limits to 
individual action and resulting possibility of one-off decision by an individual 
administrative body, based on the concept of hazard supported by experience, 
provided limitations that are now being broken through on all quarters44. In 
particular, it becomes clear in retrospect that the basis for risk decisions in the 
past lay in trust in the institutions45. This trust made possible the coordination of 
knowledge, of values and of decisional rules; its breakdown cannot be 
compensated for by unilaterally emphasizing the knowledge aspect (experts)46. 
Expert knowledge can be only artificially separated from social and 
organizational dimensions, so that scientific risk definitions are dependent on
41 Dobris Report (FN 2), p. 601.
42 E.L. Hyman/B. Stiftel, Combining Facts and Values in Environmental Impact Assessment - 
Theories and Techniques, Boulder, 1988, p. 7.
43 Cf. in general K.H. Ladeur, Das Umweltrecht der Wissensgesellschaft, Berlin 1995; Ladeur, 
“Zur Prozeduralisierung des Vorsorgebegriffs durch Risikovergleich und Prioritâtensetzung”, 
Jahrbuch UTR, 1994, p. 297ff.
44 Hyman/Stiftel, op. cit., (FN 41).
45 B. Wynne, “Risk and Social Learning”, in: S. Krimsky/D. Goldring (eds), Social Theories 
o f Risk, Westport, 1992, p. 275, 278.
46 R. Laufer, “Gouvemabilité et management des systèmes administratifs complexes”, 




























































































The European Environment Agency and Prospects for a European Network of Environmental Administrations
pre-existing “framing”47. Making a contribution towards a redefinition of this 
framing would be an important task for the EEA. The complexity of these tasks 
does not however conversely allow predecision on a new hierarchy of values on 
the basis of which a return could be made to a strategy of individual decisions 
on a stable normative basis.
The blending of empirical, methodological, scientific and theoretical 
components of decision under uncertainty with normative, procedural and 
organizational components and their linkage with various time frames cannot be 
lastingly circumvented. A promising strategy can consist only in opening up the 
traditional descriptive, analytical decision on a stable normative basis in such a 
way as to give it a learning capacity and make it permeable for adaptive, 
evolutionary procedural models of a logic of experimental relating of differing 
viewpoints, oriented to self-change and self-observation. No ready-made 
procedure can be indicated for this either48; from administrative viewpoints the 
point is particularly to develop risk management strategies that bring together 
the existing decisional components49. This means, first, that even the earlier 
assumption that inaction as compliance with the safety limit more or less had 
the presumption of safety on its side from the outset is no longer acceptable. If 
no clear attributions on the basis of a reality seen as uniform and describable by 
experience are available any longer, the sharp distinction between action (= 
changing an assumed equilibrium position) and non-action (= not disturbing 
this sort of equilibrium) is no longer a reliable starting point. Not taking a risky 
action can, in a disequilibrium model oriented to immanent self-change, lead to 
much greater risks than doing it: genetically engineered plants may produce a 
risk, but possibly the risk of doing without genetic engineering is, in view of 
present and future climatic changes, even greater.
2. More Flexible Technology - more Flexible Decision
Even if there can be no unambiguous technical and legal solutions to the new 
problems, it is nonetheless to be recognized that there are new technological
47 H.J. Otway/D.v.Winterfeldt, “Beyond Acceptable Risk: On the Social Acceptability of 
Technologies”, Policy Sciences, 1982, 247, 254; see also R.L. Keeney/D.v.Winterfeldt, 
“Eliciting Probabilities from Experts in Complex Technical Problems”, IEEE Transactions in 
Engineering Management 1991, 191 ff.; Wynne, op. cit., (FN44), 281.
48 R. Serafin/G. Nelson/R. Butler, “Post-Hoc Assessment in Resource Management and 
Environmental Planning”, Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 1992, 271ff.; V. Zitko, 
Priority Ranking o f Chemicals fo r  Risk Assessment, The Sciences o f the Total Environment, 
1990 129ff.;J.W. Hart/N.J. Jensen, Integrated Risk Assessment or Integrated Risk 
Management? Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology, 1992, 32ff.
49 M. Crozier, “Les problèmes du management public face à la transformation de 





























































































procedures able to process a multiplicity of information that previously could 
not be coped with, even including incomplete knowledge50. Thus while on the 
one hand existing risk assessment based on describing individual events has 
come up against its limits, on the other expert systems are conceivable51 that 
make it possible using computer programmes to learn from rapidly changing 
experience by event analysis and comparative modelling on the basis of a 
multiplicity of occurrences.
In particular, the large number of occurrence reports arising in complex high- 
technology plants (especially nuclear power stations) are on experts’ views 
reasonably interpretable only using computers. Particularly when the 
possibilities of including flexibility and calculation of alternatives in technical 
programmes are taken into account, it becomes conceivable to link uncertainty 
not just with the alternative between inaction and action despite uncertainty, but 
to process alternatives, and conceive intermediate decisions oriented towards 
expanding knowledge, that is, to combine knowledge and decision flexibly with 
each other.
On the other hand, technology too has become more flexible today, so that here 
too more openness to the inclusion of complex procedures for self-change on 
the basis of experience can be assumed. In the US, as already indicated, various 
approaches to priority setting in environment law and policy have been 
undertaken but have certainly not led, nor will lead, to the formulation of an 
unambiguous preference rule52. For several years the insight has been spreading 
that the existing form of regulation of environmental hazards not only neglected 
particular aspects but at the same time overevaluated others, or did not 
adequately cope with them53. The problematic consequence of this development 
is that it may also mean giving wrong signals for environment research and 
lines of innovation to pursue54. The change in environment risks, which in 
factual terms have more and more to do with diffuse, not very structured,
50 J.D. Englehardt/J.R. Lund, “Information Theory in Risk Analysis”, Journal o f 
Environmental Engineering, 1992, 890ff.; M.A. Harwell/W. Cooper/R. Flaak, “Prioritizing 
Ecological and Human Welfare Risks from Environmental Stress”, Environmental 
Management, 1992,451, 462; Hart/Jensen, op.cit., (FN 47), 131.
51 See F.Altorfer/W.Hardmann/R.Merz, “Industrielle Risiken - mit Computerhilfe aus der 
Erfahrung lemen”, NZZ, N° 278, 29.11.1995, p. 87.
52 See the references in FN 21 and (from the viewpoint of an enlightened bureaucracy) S. 
Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation, Cambridge 1993.
53 B.A. Ackerman/R.B. Stewart, “Reforming Environmental Law”, Stanford Law Review, 
1985, 1383; cf., on Cost-Benefit Analysis, also J.H.Howard/E.Benfield, “Rule-Making in the 
Shadows, the Case for OMB and Cost-Benefit-Analysis in Environmental Decision-Making”, 
Columbia Journal o f Environmental Law, 1991, 143ff.




























































































The European Environment Agency and Prospects for a European Network of Environmental Administrations
complex linkages of effects and uncertainties of description, and in 
administrative terms a corresponding difficulty in grasping the decisional 
position, is facing the State and especially the administration with quite new 
strategic challenges: the questioning of traditional normative indicators for risk 
avoidance (subjective rights and public legal goods) and the reliability of 
empirical knowledge rule out a procedure of merely quantitative multiplication 
of risks to be dealt with or of shifting the “danger limits” downwards. Thinking 
in networks of relations on the side of description of the environment must 
inevitably also be reflected in a move from an administrative model of one-off 
decision to avoid hazards seen as border-crossing, to a coordinated model of 
linkage into a variable network, oriented towards self-change, of flexible 
decisions operating with uncertainty. This must be directed towards 
accumulating learning effects and thus above all seek to portray dynamic 
interactions among partial knowledge, hypotheses about future developments, 
fragmentary public decisions, private and public innovations etc, in the form of 
modellings55. The prerequisite for this is a different form of cooperation 
between science and administration: the failings of environment law to date 
cannot be compensated for by better scientific understanding. Instead, a 
regulatory strategy has to be formulated that develops an interactive, 
evolutionary methodology of cooperation with experts56, and no longer seeks to 
cover up uncertainties, but to operate with them productively and link the 
checking of and search for new knowledge with decision. The environment 
administration must be given more freedom to set priorities and at the same 
time develop procedures for systematic observation and assessment of decisions 
to be treated as provisional. Here it is the best available knowledge that has to 
be used, but the need to decide fast has also to be recognized.
3. The EEA and the Development of Strategic Decision Models
The present debate in the USA is dominated by the call to introduce risk 
comparisons and the setting of strategic priority decisions, as well as for better 
coordination among the various administrations. The attempt is consistently 
made to define new “environment indicators” or “ecological targets” to replace
55 R.W. Hahn/J.A. Hird, “The Costs and Benefit of Regulation”, Yale Journal on Regulation, 
1991,233ff.; J.S. Applegate, “Worst Things First. Risk, Information and Regulatory 
Structures in Toxic Substances Control”, Yale Journal on Regulation, 1992, 277, 350; R. 
Shifrin, “Not by Risk Alone: Reforming EPA Research Priorities”, Yale Law Journal 1992, 
552ff.; N.A. AshfordCh.Ayers/R.F. Stone, “Using Regulation to Change the Market for 
Innovation”, Harvard Environmental Law Review, 1985,419ff. ; D. Homstein, “Reclaiming 
Environmental Law. A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Assessment”, Columbia Law 
Review, 1992, 562, 573, 585.





























































































the old, narrowly limited, rights or legal goods attributed to the individual or the 
State57. In Europe, particularly in the Netherlands, a planning/cooperative 
element had been built into environment policy for some years now58, similarly 
aimed at adding something to the old empirically-based practices and especially 
at promoting the coordination of public and private decision-makers. The need 
here is to specify the environmental requirements on industry better, design 
them on a longer-term basis and attune them better to private possibilities of 
action so that more effective cost-benefit strategies can be formulated. Details 
need not be gone into in the framework adopted here. From the European angle, 
the need may be primarily to stress the possibilities of building up a network of 
national environment agencies and authorities contained in the EEA conception, 
and orient the role definition of the new European institution on that. Linking 
up to the various national agents involved and the European agency itself offers 
approaches towards a productive dynamic of developing a flexible, strategic 
policy on environmental law, involving not just informal cooperation, but using 
the room for experimentation contained in the network construction to develop 
strategies and set priorities. At the same time, the differing competences, legal 
bases and administrative traditions of national agencies could be used as the 
basis for mutual monitoring (of one agency by another), especially in 
implementing varied action strategies arranged to harmonize with each other. 
Correspondingly, the lack of unity associated with the network conception 
could be turned to advantage in an experimentally-oriented strategic model. The 
differing priorities among the various countries could also be taken more 
account of by testing various strategies alongside each other and comparatively 
assessing them. The EEA ought here to concentrate on developing complex 
methods of risk comparison, building up interactive priority-setting systems and 
cooperative procedures among science, administration and policy, exploiting 
the advantages of the network model both procedurally and in formulating 
objectives. The attempt should also be made to conceive new forms of 
transnational harmonization of legal dogmatics, enabling learning by 
comparison of national decisional procedures on the basis of European 
regulations (e.g. EIA procedures).
57 Harwell et al., op. cit., (FN 49).
58 Cf. in general A. Rest, “Neue Mechanismen der Zusammenarbeit und Sanktionierung im 
intemationalen Umweltrecht”, NuR, 1994, 271 ff.; R.J. van Lint et al., “Strategic Planning in 
the Netherlands’ Environmental Policy”, in: OECD Hazardous Air Pollutants, 1995, p. 186ff.; 
W.-Bennett, “The History of the Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan”, Environment 





























































































The European Environment Agency and Prospects for a European Network of Environmental Administrations
VI. Summary
The above considerations should have shown that the disputes around the 
creation of the EEA have at least in part set up false fronts by setting the 
questions of power to create new institutions and the allocation of decisional 
possibilities in the foreground. Particularly inclusion of the EEA in a network of 
national agencies offers promising possibilities for developing more complex 
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